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Abstract
Background: Autism is a developmental disorder characterized by decreased interest and engagement in social interactions
and by enhanced self-focus. While previous theoretical approaches to understanding autism have emphasized social
impairments and altered interpersonal interactions, there is a recent shift towards understanding the nature of the
representation of the self in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Still, the neural mechanisms subserving self-
representations in ASD are relatively unexplored.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We used event-related fMRI to investigate brain responsiveness to images of the
subjects’ own face and to faces of others. Children with ASD and typically developing (TD) children viewed randomly
presented digital morphs between their own face and a gender-matched other face, and made ‘‘self/other’’ judgments.
Both groups of children activated a right premotor/prefrontal system when identifying images containing a greater
percentage of the self face. However, while TD children showed activation of this system during both self- and other-
processing, children with ASD only recruited this system while viewing images containing mostly their own face.
Conclusions/Significance: This functional dissociation between the representation of self versus others points to a potential
neural substrate for the characteristic self-focus and decreased social understanding exhibited by these individuals, and
suggests that individuals with ASD lack the shared neural representations for self and others that TD children and adults
possess and may use to understand others.
Citation: Uddin LQ, Davies MS, Scott AA, Zaidel E, Bookheimer SY, et al. (2008) Neural Basis of Self and Other Representation in Autism: An fMRI Study of Self-Face
Recognition. PLoS ONE 3(10): e3526. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003526
Editor: Jan Lauwereyns, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
Received September 3, 2008; Accepted October 1, 2008; Published October 29, 2008
Copyright:  2008 Uddin et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was supported in part by grants from NICHD (PO1 HD035470), the National Alliance for Autism Research, and a National Science Foundation
Graduate Research Fellowship to L.Q. Uddin. For generous support the authors also wish to thank the Brain Mapping Medical Research Organization, Brain
Mapping Support Foundation, Pierson-Lovelace Foundation, Ahmanson Foundation, Tamkin Foundation, Jennifer Jones-Simon Foundation, Capital Group
Companies Charitable Foundation, Robson Family, William M. and Linda R. Dietel Philanthropic Fund at the Northern Piedmont Community Foundation, and
Northstar Fund. This project was in part also supported by grants (RR12169, RR13642 and RR00865) from the National Center for Research Resources (NCRR), a
component of the National Institutes of Health (NIH); its contents are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of
NCR or NIH. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: lucina@stanford.edu
Introduction
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a complex developmental
condition in which fundamental social development and commu-
nication are compromised [1,2], often with concomitant restricted
interests and repetitive and stereotyped behaviors. The term
‘‘autism’’ is derived from the Greek word ‘‘autos’’, meaning ‘‘self’’.
The first case studies of the condition include numerous
descriptions of the solitary characteristics of the children
examined. In describing one boy, Kanner (1943) writes ‘‘he got
happiest when left alone, almost never cried to go with his mother,
did not seem to notice his father’s homecomings, and was
indifferent to visiting relatives…He seems to be self-satisfied…al-
most to draw into his shell and live within himself...To get his
attention almost requires one to break down a mental barrier
between his inner consciousness and the outside world.’’ Kanner’s
early work includes numerous such references to the seeming
indifference to social interaction and extreme self-focus exhibited
by these children, who, as he observed, regarded contact with
others as ‘‘interference’’. In describing another child he writes that
he ‘‘…behaved as if people as such did not matter or even exist’’
and describes one young girl as giving ‘‘the impression of being
self-absorbed’’ [3]. While this and subsequent reports have
highlighted the primary significance of altered self- and other-
representations in ASD [4,5], the question of what specific brain
processes give rise to these phenomena remains open.
Despite recent efforts to use a cognitive neuroscientific approach
to understand key components of the ASD symptomatology, there
is still little consensus as to its precise neurobiological underpin-
nings. Several imaging studies have shown both structural and
functional brain abnormalities in individuals with ASD (see [6]
and [7] for reviews), but reports are still far from consistent.
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social cognition have long been implicated in autism [8,9]. While
previous work has focused largely on interpersonal cognition in
autism, a recent shift has been towards understanding altered
intrapersonal cognition in ASD. One recent study highlights broad
impairments in both self-referential cognition and empathy as
measured by a battery of scales designed to measure these
constructs [10].
It has been suggested that the core symptoms of autism may
result from a lack of the fundamental appreciation of the
commonality between self and others [11]. Such interpersonal
awareness may be mediated by a right fronto-parietal neural
network [12]. Our previous work also suggests that in adults, a
right fronto-parietal network responds to both self and other
familiar faces, with greatest activity in response to stimuli most
resembling the self-face [13,14]. These regions engaged during
self- and other-face processing overlap with areas that may contain
mirror neurons [15,16]. Recently, it has been proposed that
mirror neuron dysfunction may underlie some of the symptoms
characteristic of ASD, including deficits in social cognition [17–
19]. Preliminary support for the mirror neuron dysfunction theory
of autism comes from studies using fMRI [20], EEG [21,22],
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) [23], EMG [24] and
structural MRI [25] (see [18] and [26] for reviews). To date no
neuroimaging study has attempted to examine whether such
dysfunction contributes to aberrent self-other representations using
facial stimuli in individuals with ASD.
Self-face recognition is evidenced by typically developing
children around 2 years of age [27]. Many young children with
autism exhibit a developmental delay in the acquisition of this
ability, though the majority tested to date show evidence of some
self-recognition [28,29]. The ability to self-recognize is often
thought of as indicative of an underlying self-concept [30], as it
tends to develop in parallel with the use of personal pronouns (‘‘I’’
and ‘‘me’’) [31], and has only been reliably demonstrated in
humans and great apes [32]. Little is currently known about the
development of neural systems supporting self-recognition, and
even less is known about the integrity of these systems in autism.
The current study aimed to investigate the functioning of neural
systems involved in shared representations for self and others in
autistic children. We used a self-face recognition paradigm to test
whether the autistic profile may involve abnormal functioning of
fronto-parietal systems during self- and other-representation.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Eighteen high-functioning ASD and 12 age-and IQ matched
TD (all male) children were recruited and compensated for their
participation in this fMRI study. Due to excessive head
movements (.3 mm mean displacement), the final analyses
include 12 children with ASD (average age: 13.1962.61, average
full-scale IQ: 116614) and 12 TD children (average age
12.2362.10, average full-scale IQ: 11968). The two groups did
not differ significantly with respect to age or IQ (See Table 1). All
participants were right-handed as confirmed by self and parent
reports as well as by examiner observation. Participants were
recruited through the Autism Evaluation Clinic at UCLA, and
flyers posted throughout the Los Angeles area, and from a pool of
subjects who had previously participated in other research studies
at UCLA. A prior clinical diagnosis of ASD was confirmed
utilizing both the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-
Generic (ADOS-G) [33] and the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (ADI-R) [34]. Participants and parents gave written
informed consent (assent for children under 13) according to the
guidelines of the UCLA Institutional Review Board and were
compensated for their participation. All participants were screened
to rule out medication use, head trauma, and history of
neurological or psychiatric disorders, substance abuse, or other
serious medical conditions.
Image acquisition
Images were acquired using a Siemens Allegra 3.0 Tesla MRI
scanner. Each child completed 2 functional runs lasting 5 min
8 sec each (152 EPI volumes, gradient-echo, TR=2000 ms,
TE=25 ms, flip angle=90u), each with 36 transverse slices,
3mm thick, 1 mm gap, and a 64664 matrix yielding an in-plane
resolution of 3 mm63 mm. Co-planar high-resolution EPI
structural images were acquired to aid image registration
(TR=5000 ms, TE=33 ms, 1286128 matrix size).
Stimuli and Task
Stimuli were individually tailored to each child, and consisted of
a series of static color images constructed from pictures acquired
on a Kodak 3400C digital camera of the child’s own face (self) and
the face of another person (other). The Other face was chosen
from the MacBrain Face Stimulus Set (http://www.macbrain.
org/faces/index.htm). We chose faces from this stimulus set for the
Other face because subjects had previously viewed faces from this
stimulus set in other experiments. Thus, novelty effects were
minimized. MorphEditor (SoftKey Corporation, Cambridge, MA)
Table 1. Participant Characteristics.
Participant
Classification Age
Full-Scale
IQ
ADI-R
Score
ADOS
Score
ASD 1 17.85 134 20 9
ASD 2 15.59 106 45 17
ASD 3 11.84 118 42 8
ASD 4 16.15 127 N/A N/A
ASD 5 9.78 120 32 12
ASD 6 9.37 93 47 9
ASD 7 11.71 127 43 10
ASD 8 11.24 122 26 10
ASD 9 12.21 121 40 13
ASD 10 13.63 129 38 20
ASD 11 14.77 108 35 14
ASD 12 14.14 91 59 24
TD 1 14.23 134
TD 2 13.06 119
TD 3 8.87 116
TD 4 11.49 115
TD 5 13.28 104
TD 6 12.45 119
TD 7 10.93 128
TD 8 15.00 125
TD 9 14.53 115
TD 10 11.57 116
TD 11 8.32 118
TD 12 13.02 124
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003526.t001
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the other face (a gender- and race-matched face chosen from the
MacBrain Face Stimulus Set), resulting in 6 unique faces, each
morphed to a varying extent (0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%,
with 0% being ‘‘no morphing of self’’). See Figure 1 for examples
of types stimuli used in the experiment. The actual stimuli used in
the experiment are not shown in order to protect the identity of
our participants. Images were edited using Adobe Photoshop to
remove external features (hair, ears) and create a uniform gray
background. A scrambled control face was created by randomly
rearranging one image. The software package Presentation
(Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., http://www.neuro-bs.com/) was
used to present stimuli and record responses. Stimuli were
presented through magnet-compatible goggles (Resonance Tech-
nology Inc.) and responses were recorded using two buttons of an
fMRI compatible response pad. During each functional run, each
of the six morphed faces and the scrambled control were presented
10 times in a random sequence optimized and counterbalanced
using the optseq algorithm (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/
optseq/), which provides temporal jitter to increase signal
discriminability [35]. Each of the two runs consisted of a different
optimized random sequence. Each stimulus was presented for 2
seconds, with at least a 1 second gap between each stimulus
presentation. Participants were instructed to press one button with
their right hand if the image presented looked like self, and
another button if it looked like an other or scrambled face.
Data Processing and Statistical Analyses
Functional imaging analysis was carried out using FEAT (FMRI
Expert Analysis Tool), part of FSL (FMRIB’s Software Library,
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). After motion correction, images were
temporally high-pass filtered with a cutoff period of 50 seconds
and smoothed using an 8 mm Gaussian FWHM algorithm in 3
dimensions. The BOLD response was modeled using a separate
explanatory variable (EV) for each of the seven stimulus types. For
each stimulus type, the presentation design was convolved with a
gamma function to produce an expected BOLD response. The
temporal derivative of this timecourse was also included in the
model for each EV. Data were then fitted to the model using FSL’s
implementation of the general linear model, with motion
components included as confound EVs.
Each participant’s statistical data was then warped into a
standard space based on the MNI-152 atlas. We used FLIRT
(FMRIB’s Linear Image Registration Tool) to register the
functional data to the atlas space in two stages. Functional images
were aligned with the high-resolution co-planar T2-weighted
image using a 6 degrees-of-freedom rigid-body warping procedure.
The co-planar volume was registered to the standard MNI atlas
with a 12 degrees-of-freedom affine transformation.
Statistical analyses were conducted with FSL using mixed-
effects models to compute group differences. Higher-level analysis
was carried out using FLAME (FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed
Effects) [36]. Z (Gaussianized T/F) statistic images were
thresholded using Z.2.3 and a (corrected) cluster significance
threshold of p=0.05 [37–39].
To investigate effects in an a priori region of interest (right inferior
frontal gyrus,activatedinourpreviousself-recognitionstudy[13]),a
mask was derived based on regions activated in the Task-Rest
contrast for TD children. Here we use ‘‘Rest’’ to refer to periods
between stimulus presentations, during which subjects fixated on a
central cross. For this between-group comparison, Z statistic images
were thresholded at p=0.01 (uncorrected voxel p threshold).
Additional ROIs created from anatomical parcellation based on
the Harvard-Oxford Structural Atlas provided by FSL [40,41]
were used to query neural response in several regions comprising
classical face processing networks [42] and additional regions of
particular interest in this study based on our previous work [13],
including Brodmann Area (BA) 44, BA 45, middle frontal gyrus,
precentral gyrus, angular gyrus, superior parietal cortex, lateral
occipital cortex, and fusiform gyrus (also referred to as fusiform
face area, FFA).
Results
Behavioral
Figure 2a shows the participants’ percent self responses for each
of the seven stimulus types, and Figure 2b shows participants’
reaction times. Due to technical failure, behavioral responses were
not collected from three ASD and two TD children. As expected,
the number of self responses diminished as the images presented
contained less of the self-face, indicating that both TD and ASD
children were able to successfully perform the task. There were no
significant group differences in behavioral performance, neither in
% self responses nor reaction time.
fMRI
Self.Rest and Other.Rest Contrasts. The Self.Rest
(0%, 20%, and 40%.Rest) contrast for the ASD group revealed
activations in the right lateral occipital cortex, right occipital
fusiform gyrus, right temporal occipital fusiform cortex, right
precentral gyrus, right inferior frontal gyrus, right insular cortex,
left lateral occipital cortex, left occipital pole, and left temporal
occipital fusiform cortex. The Self.Rest contrast for the TD
group revealed a nearly identical pattern of activation (Table 2,
Figure 3). Direct comparisons (ASD.TD, TD.ASD) between
groups revealed no significant differences for the contrast of
Self.Rest in whole-brain analyses (Z.2.3, cluster significance
threshold of p=0.05, corrected).
Figure 1. Examples of types of stimuli used in the experiment. For each participant, a series of morphed images were created between the
participant’s own face and another gender-matched face. This resulted in six face images, from 0% morphing (Self) to 100% morphing (Other).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003526.g001
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ASD group showed activations in right occipital fusiform gyrus,
right lateral occipital cortex, left occipital fusiform gyrus, and left
temporal occipital fusiform cortex. The Other.Rest contrast for
the TD group showed activations in right occipital fusiform gyrus,
right lateral occipital cortex, right inferior frontal gyrus, right
precentral gyrus, right insular cortex, right frontal operculum
cortex, left occipital fusiform gyrus, and left temporal occipital
fusiform cortex. While directstatistical comparisons between groups
(ASD.TD, TD.ASD) revealed no significant differences for the
contrast of Other.Rest in whole-brain, cluster corrected analyses
(Z.2.3, cluster significance threshold of p=0.05, corrected), the
within-group results for the Other.Rest contrast revealed striking
differences between TD and ASD children in the right prefrontal
cortex. Specifically, while TD children activated the right inferior
frontal gyrus (rIFG) while viewing images of others, there was no
change in activity between Other versus Rest for the ASD children
(Table 2, Figure 3). For this reason, and based on previous studies
implicating the rIFG in similar face-processing tasks [13,43–45], we
conducted a subsequent between-group analysis focusing specifi-
cally on the right prefrontal cluster, using a functionally defined
region-of-interest (ROI) derived from the group mean of the TD
children in the Task-Rest contrast. As shown in Figure 4, the results
of this analysis showed greater rIFG signal change for Other.Rest
in TD children than in ASD children.
ROI Analyses. Using anatomically defined ROIs provided
by the Harvard-Oxford Structural Atlas, signal intensities were
estimated within the following brain regions in the right
hemisphere: BA 44, BA 45, middle frontal gyrus, precentral
gyrus, angular gyrus, superior parietal cortex, lateral occipital
cortex, and fusiform gyrus (Figure 5). For all of these regions, no
significant differences were found between the ASD and TD group
during viewing of Self faces (Figure 6). Additionally, the only
regions in which group differences in signal intensity for viewing
Other faces approached significance were BA 44 (t(22)=1.717,
p=0.07) and BA 45 (t(22)=1.717, p=0.08), confirming the results
of our between-group comparison based on the functionally
defined ROI in this area.
Figure 2. a: Behavioral responses to the task. Both groups of children (ASD and TD) showed decreasing ‘‘self’’ responses as the image presented
contained less of the self-face, demonstrating behavioral competence. Error bars represent standard error. b: Reaction Time. There were no
significant differences between groups with respect to reaction time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003526.g002
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Group/Contrast Region MNI Coordinates Max Z-score
xy z
ASD: Self.Rest Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 40 272 28 6.31
Right Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 30 282 214 5.26
Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 36 282 22 4.68
Right Temporal Occipital Fusiform Cortex 42 254 28 4.4
Right Temporal Occipital Fusiform Cortex 38 250 214 4.2
Right Temporal Occipital Fusiform Cortex 38 254 218 4.17
Left Lateral Occipital Cortex 232 286 28 5.55
Left Lateral Occipital Cortex 240 282 212 5.14
Left Occipital Pole 214 2100 2 3.92
Left Occipital Pole 220 294 2 3.7
Left Temporal Occipital Fusiform Cortex 238 264 218 3.67
Left Temporal Occipital Fusiform Cortex 234 248 220 3.64
Right Precentral Gyrus 50 6 26 4.61
Right Frontal Pole/Inferior Frontal Gyrus 40 34 14 4.49
Right Insular Cortex 34 24 0 3.65
Right Insular Cortex 32 16 8 3.56
Right Precentral Gyrus 48 4 40 3.4
Right Precentral Gyrus 40 0 40 3.19
TD: Self.Rest Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 40 272 210 6.89
Left Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 230 286 214 6.15
Left Lateral Occipital Cortex 242 282 212 6.06
Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 46 262 216 5.83
Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 28 276 26 5.1
Right Temporal Occipital Fusiform Cortex 38 242 222 4.8
Right Precentral Gyrus 50 6 26 4.59
Right Frontal Pole/Inferior Frontal Gyrus 40 34 12 4.23
Right Insular Cortex 32 18 28 4.21
Right Frontal Pole 38 48 10 3.85
Right Frontal Pole 42 48 10 3.84
Right Frontal Operculum/Frontal Orbital Cortex 34 28 4 3.77
ASD: Other.Rest Right Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 28 284 216 6.09
Left Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 230 284 210 5.06
Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 42 276 214 4.78
Left Temporal Occipital Fusiform Cortex 232 248 222 4.52
Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 40 274 28 4.51
Left Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 218 288 214 4.31
TD: Other.Rest Right Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 30 284 216 7.02
Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 42 272 214 6.15
Left Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 230 284 216 6.12
Left Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 242 266 224 6.07
Right Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 22 288 212 6.04
Left Temporal Occipital Fusiform Cortex 236 258 218 5.88
Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus 52 14 30 4.61
Right Precentral Gyrus 48 6 28 4.55
Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus 42 32 10 4.29
Right Frontal Operculum/Insular Cortex 32 26 6 3.71
Right Frontal Operculum Cortex 40 12 6 3.32
Right Insular Cortex 30 16 2 3.22
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003526.t002
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The representation of self and other may be fundamentally
altered in autism spectrum disorders [4]. While previous work has
largely emphasized deficits in interpersonal interaction in ASD,
current empirical work emphasizes the need for understanding
differences with respect to both interpersonal (social) and intrapersonal
(self-referential) cognition [10]. Previously we and others have
shown that in normal adults, self-recognition is accompanied by
signal changes in a right hemisphere network including the inferior
frontal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule [13,43,44], consistent
with earlier work implicating preferential right hemisphere
involvement in self-recognition [46]. Here we used this paradigm
to test whether children with ASD recruit the same brain areas
during self- and other-face processing as do TD children. We
showed that while self- and other-face processing involve virtually
overlapping right frontal activity in TD children, children with
ASD only exhibit such activation when viewing their own faces.
ROI analyses confirm that ASD and TD children differentially
activate the rIFG (specifically BA44 and BA45) during viewing of
other faces. Specifically, children with ASD activate the rIFG less
than do TD children during viewing of other faces. In every other
ROI within the broader face-processing networks we examined,
we observed no significant group differences during viewing of self
or other faces. Thus, consistent with clinical observations of higher
levels of self-focused behavior in autism, these children show
decreased neural response to viewing faces of others compared to
Figure 3. While both groups of children activated the right IFG while viewing of faces of themselves, only TD children also
activated this region while viewing faces of others.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003526.g003
Figure 4. TD children showed greater activation to other faces than children with ASD, specifically in the right IFG region-of-
interest.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003526.g004
Self-Recognition in Autism
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 October 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 10 | e3526viewing faces of themselves. While hypoactivation of the fusiform
gyrus to faces has been previously reported [47], this region does
not appear to be involved in self-other distinction as examined in
the current study. One can speculate that normal engagement of
several brain regions by self faces and reduced activity to other
faces in the rIFG might be related to the social impairments
characteristic of children with ASD.
Previous work on the neural basis of self-face recognition in
adults suggests that while the right inferior frontal gyrus responds
most strongly to self-faces, it also shows signal increases (although
Figure 5. ROIs based on Harvard-Oxford atlas used to probe differences between TD and ASD groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003526.g005
Figure 6. ROI analyses indicated hypoactivation to Other faces in the ASD group in BA 44 and BA 45.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003526.g006
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fact that the TD children examined in this study do not yet show
self-other differentiation in the right IFG suggests that our cross-
sectional design captures a period in cognitive development where
this distinction is not robustly represented, and a great deal of self-
other overlap exists. One may speculate that as the representation
of self becomes more differentiated in post-adolescent develop-
ment, the rIFG activation to self relative to others becomes more
selective. In contrast, children with ASD appear to not exhibit this
neural overlap. As our study did not use personally familiar faces
as controls, we cannot address the interesting question of whether
the response of the rIFG of children with ASD is modulated by
personal familiarity, as has been suggested for the fusiform face
area [48].
Our paradigm required participants to explicitly evaluate facial
identity to decide whether the image presented resembled
themselves. Both groups of children behaviorally demonstrated a
diminishing ‘‘self’’ response as the image presented contained a
smaller percentage of the self face, indicating successful self-other
discrimination. This result is consistent with behavioral work
demonstrating successful visual self-recognition in most children
with ASD [28,29,49]. Our previous work has implicated the right
inferior parietal lobule in this type of discrimination, as virtual
lesions induced with rTMS reduced subjects sensitivity to detecting
self faces [14]. The right IPL is thought to be part of a circuit
mediating complex own-body perception [50], and contributes to
the sense of agency, or the feeling of generation of action [51]. We
saw no significant group differences during viewing of self-faces in
this region, suggesting that the perception of the self face as part of
one’s own body is not altered in children with ASD. Rather, it
appears that the mechanisms for detecting self-other similarity,
likely dependent on the right inferior frontal gyrus, are
dysfunctional in these children. The mechanisms implemented
by the rIFG likely mediate differences between ASD and TD
children in social interactions that are more complex than those
tapped by our self-other discrimination task.
Social cognition researchers have previously suggested that
understanding of others’ experiences may involve the activation of
shared affective neural networks that enable us to ‘‘feel the
emotions of others as if they were our own’’ [52]. There is now a
fairly substantial literature documenting the existence of shared
neural representations that bridge the gap between the self and
other in various domains, including the experience of pain [53],
touch [54], and emotion [55,56]. Such ‘‘embodied simulation’’
accounts of action and emotion understanding go by many names
(e.g. ‘‘shared manifold of intersubjectivity’’ or ‘‘intentional
attunement’’ [57], ‘‘shared representations’’ [12], ‘‘shared circuits’’
[58]), but they all support the notion that one of the ways by which
an individual makes sense of the social world is by using the same
brain systems that are used for self-related experiences in order to
understand others. This overlap in self- and other-representation
may breakdown in autism, which is characterized by decreased
empathy [59] and theory of mind impairments [8]. The restricted
social interests of individuals with autism may thus reflect a
fundamental lack of appreciation of self-other similarities, which
may be the result of altered mirroring mechanisms in the brains of
such individuals. There is also mounting evidence for dysfunction
of the so-called mirror neuron system, which is implicated in social
cognition [60], in individuals with autism [18,20–25,61].
One possible explanation for the lack of rIFG response to others
observed in this group of children with ASD may be the fact that
from a young age autistic individuals seem to lack the motivation for
orienting to social cues that their typically developing counterparts
demonstrate [62]. Indeed, some have theorized that the lack of
interest in social stimuli evident in autistic children may result from
the fact that ASD children do not find these stimuli to be rewarding
[63]. Previous reports have shown that when children with ASD are
instructed to pay attention to specific aspects of social stimuli (e.g. a
person’s facial expression or tone of voice), neural responses more
closely resemble those of TD children [64,65]. Thus, while socially
relevant stimuli such as other’s faces may not automatically engage
the attention of children with ASD who are less driven by social
motivation, explicit instruction to attend can ameliorate this effect.
In the present study, however, the task instructions focused the
children’s attention to detecting the self, perhaps further decreasing
the amount of attention directed toward others. Future work should
examine whether simply modifying task instruction (i.e. asking
participants to detect the presence of other faces in the morphs) may
‘‘normalize’’ neural activity to other faces in children with ASD.
In conclusion, we find that children with ASD do not activate
shared regions for self- and other-face processing, as do TD
children. Reduction of activity in right prefrontal areas during
other-face processing may be a neural signature of reduced social
engagement and understanding in these individuals.
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